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ORIGINALISM AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
STEPHEN L. CARTER*
I shall begin with a disclaimer. I am a separation of powers
scholar. I do not think of myself as a Bill of Rights scholar. I
study the Constitution of 1787. My bicentennial was four years
ago. This topic for me is something new.
In my separation of powers jurisprudence, I often am de-
scribed by those who have read my work as an originalist. 1 I do
not necessarily describe myself that way, but that label will do
for the time being. I am something of an originalist, not be-
cause I believe that the Founders wanted things that way, but
because, for some of the reasons that Gary Lawson2 and Lino
Graglia3 have stated, and for some other reasons that I will not
bother to explain just now, originalism-at least the right form
of originalism-is the only methodology through which courts
can solve both the problems of determinacy and justification
that Gary Lawson mentions.4
There are many ways of solving the problems of determi-
nacy; there are many ways of solving the problems of
justification. There are not, however, many ways to solve both
simultaneously. Both are solved when courts are able to say
that they are enforcing the understanding under which particu-
lar constitutional provisions were adopted. I make no claim
that the understanding thereby enforced will always be a good
thing, only that the judicial decisions that enforce it are more
legitimate than those that do not.5
• William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Q;testions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis ofProfes-
sor Carter's Approach toJudicial Review, 66 B.U. L. REV. 47,50 (1986) ("Professor Carter
concludes that because the Constitution is clear as to the manner in which government
should be structured and operated, the Court should follow an originalist approach in
deciding cases related to the political Constitution."); see also E. Donald Elliott, Why Our
Separation ojPowers Jurisprudence is so Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989).
2. See Gary S. Lawson, An Interpretivist Agenda, 15 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 157, 158-60
(1992).
3. See Lino A. Graglia, How Should Courts Interpret the Bill of Rights?, 15 HARV. J.L. &
PuB. POL'y 149, 153-55 (1992).
4. See Lawson, supra note 2, at 153-55.
5. For my extended justification for this position, see, for example, Stephen L.
Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative
Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (1990); Stephen L. Carter From Sick Chicken to
Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution ofthe Separation ofPowers, 1987 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 719.
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Applying this methodology to the Bill of Rights, however,
raises some interesting problems: What type of originalism are
we talking' about when we talk about the Bill of Rights? Are
there unusual hermeneutical problems here-problems of in-
.terpretation that are different from those flowing from the
structural provisions of the Constitution that I ordinarily study?
My tentative conclusion is that there are indeed some different
problems. The research project that Gary Lawson has laid out
for US,6 and that Lino Graglia has in some ways implicitly en-
dorsed,7 may face some special difficulties when one looks at
the Bill ofRights. The reason has nothing to do with the notion
that, "Oh, well, the world is a complex place and we need lots
ofnew rights." The reason flows from the other side of my own
scholarship; it flows from problems involving the 1787 Consti-
tution-the structure of government, the separation of powers,
and the system of checks and balances that the Constitution
sets out.
In the course of my years of studying the 1787 Constitution,
I have occasionally encountered references to the Bill of
Rights. One can scarcely read the history of the ratification of
the 1787 Constitution without coming across references to a
"bill of rights," usually an argument about whether there
should be rights specified in the Constitution or not.s There
were, in 1787, two principal arguments that were pressed
against the addition of a bill of rights for the Constitution. The
arguments are both quite enlightening, and they help point to
the problems we face in trying to apply the Bill ofRights today.
One objection was the very explicit concern that if a bill of
rights were added to the Constitution, future generations less
wise than the Founders would believe that only those rights
enumerated in the bill are protected against government intru-
sion.9 So we begin with this problem: When one sets out to
interpret the Bill of Rights, what exactly is one aspiring to do?
6. See Lawson, supra note 2, at 161.
7. See Graglia, supra note 3, at 153-55.
8. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587-88 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]; CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: TilE
GRAND CONVENTION 226-27, 259, 284 (Norton 1987).
9. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed. 1961);James Wilson, Speech in the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), ill 3
RECORDS, supra note 8, at 143-44; see alsoJames Madison, Speech to the House Explain-
ing His Proposed Amendment (1789), in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: TilE
HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 51 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
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Is one aspiring to assuage the fears of opponents of the Bill of
Rights that we will consider those rights to be all of the rights
protected against the government? Or is one simply trying to
say that because these are all the rights that are stated, these
are all the rights that we will protect-thereby walking into ex-
actly the trap against which the Founders warned in the debate
about ratification?
We can, if we wish to, walk into that trap, and there are even
arguments in favor of doing so. For example, one might argue
that because we cannot possibly know what other rights the
Founders might have had in mind, we should just enforce the
ones that we know, and trust the rest to the good sense of the
people.10 This is a perfectly reasonable argument. It may be a
persuasive argument. It is not, however, an originalist argu-
ment because it has very little to do with the original under-
standing of the purpose of the Bill of Rights.
My next point about the problems of understanding across
the generations deals with what has happened to the power of
the federal government since 1787. Indeed, the balance of my
remarks will be about the Bill of Rights as a check on federal
power, not state power. The second argument made against
the adoption of a bill of rights was that the federal government
did not have enough power to make the Bill of Rights neces-
sary.l1 A number of delegates said, for instance, that there was
no need to adopt a special provision protecting freedom of the
press because the federal government had not been delegated
any power to regulate the press. 12 Moreover, if such a provi-
sion were to be adopted, the implication for future generations
would be that the federal government has powers beyond those
expressly delegated to it, which is exactly what the Founders
were trying to guard against. 13
10. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986).
II. See, e.g. ,JAMES IREDELL, ANSWERS TO MR. MASON'S OBJECTIONS TO TIlE NEW CON-
STITUTION (1788), reprinted in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ROOTS OF TIlE BILL OF RIGHTS 449
(1971). James Iredell argued:
[A]fter defining the powers that are to be exercised, to say that [the govern-
ment] shall exercise no other power (either by a general or particular enumer-
ation) would seem to me both nugatory and ridiculous. As well might aJudge
when he condemns a man to be hanged, give strong injunctions to the Sheriff
that he should not be beheaded.
12. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 8, at 617-618.
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 9, at 513. Arguing against the inclusion of
a bill of rights, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
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This second assumption of the Founders, however, has ut-
terly collapsed. We live in a world in which virtually no one-
certainly no one who wants to be taken seriously as a scholar, as
an intellectual, or as a private citizen-considers the federal
government to be a government of limited and delegated pow-
ers. The federal government is conceded, even by the courts, to
possess a broad plenary authority to do pretty much anything it
likes so long as it does not tread on some particular right that
can be found somewhere else in the Constitution. 14 I am not
evaluating this development, nor am I suggesting that this de-
velopment is bad. Rather, I only suggest that it makes the world
in which we must apply the Bill of Rights very different from
the Founders' world. I am not referring to social, political, and
economic changes. I mean that it is a different constitutional
world.
The Bill of Rights was written and understood in a world in
which the federal government was expected to have relatively
little power and to exercise it rarely, in which the Congress was
expected to be in session occasionally rather than constantly, in
which the President was not expected to have very much to do
other than occasionally' fight wars and receive foreign ambassa-
dors. We live in a world in which none of that is true, and the
question then is what the originalist judge does when faced
with the problem ofapplying the Bill of Rights in such a world.
I will not answer that question by proposing a theory. Instead, I
will suggest that many of the decisions that give an expansive
reading to various provisions of the Bill of Rights-expansive
as against federal power--may plausibly be understood as an
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in
which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed con-
stitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various excep-
tions to powers which are not granted; and on this account would alford a
colourable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that
things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why for instance,
should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no
power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?
14. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the enforcement of
a congressional prohibition of racial discrimination against a small restaurant on the
grounds that all segregated restaurants worked to inhibit interstate commerce); Heart
ofAtlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding congressional power
in Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit racial discrimination in places
of public accommodation); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941)
("[Whatever] their motive and purpose, regulations ofcommerce which do not infringe
some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by
the Commerce Clause.").
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effort to return to an original understanding under which the
federal government has limited rather than extensive power to
regulate in as many areas as it may please.
Let me mention two areas in which the Supreme Court has
handed down very controversial decisions that are sometimes
thought indefensible on originalist grounds. In presenting
them I am suggesting "what was really going on," in the sense
in which scholars use the phrase-which is to say, we could tell
a story that went this way, even though we do not necessarily
believe that anybody actually thought this way. I will tell a story
to justify those decisions using a checks-and-balances approach
rather than the "emanations from the penumbras" approach
that Professor Graglia discussed.15
First, criminal procedure is an area in which the Supreme
Court has handed down any number of decisions that are very
difficult, I gather, for originalists to comprehend, let alone jus-
tify. I will not pretend to know the original understanding of
the Fourthl6 or Fifth Amendmentl7-not only not in detail, but
not at all. I do know, however, that they certainly were not un-
derstood at the time the Constitution was adopted to mean that
the federal government would be in the habit of enacting many
criminal statutes-quite the contrary. Criminal law was basi-
cally the province of the States. There were some areas in
which the federal government was expected to have a criminal
law. Many of the crimes that one finds discussed in the debates
involve acts that occur on the high seas,18 which is perfectly
understandable when you realize that the United States was
largely a maritime nation at the time. Likewise, many of the de-
bates, especially the ones in the ratification conventions, had to
do with commercial and economic relations among these sov-
ereign States that were banding together, or commercial and
economic relations with foreign nations.19
So the federal government was not expected to have very
many criminal laws; indeed, it was not until the middle of the
15. See Graglia, supra note 3, at 149.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects ... shall not be violated").
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... compelled ... to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law").
18. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 8, at 312,315,316,320.
19. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Twentieth Century that .the Supreme Court made it clear that
the federal government can adopt criminal laws on just about
any subject.2o Under what authority did the Court do so?
Under the general police powel'-we call it the Commerce
Clause,21 but it is really the police powel'-the power the fed-
eral government shares with the States to do anything it pleases
so long as it does not trample on rights. The Commerce Clause
is the source of the federal government's power to enact
criminal legislation banning just about anything it pleases.22
Although I perceive both substantive constitutional and policy
problems with some of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment pro-
cedural protections that the Court has adopted, these protec-
tions, at least insofar as they limit federal criminal
prosecutions, may largely be responses to an explosive growth
in federal criminal power far beyond any authority the Framers
thought they were delegating to the national government.
The second difficult area for originalists focuses on Bolling v.
Sharpe.23 In Bolling, the companion case to Brown v. Board ofEd-
ucation,24 the Supreme Court announced, in effect, that all these
years litigating under the Fourteenth Amendment were unnec-
essary because the Fifth Amendment had banned racial segre-
gation by the federal government all along.25 Bolling was an
important moral statement by the Court, but no one pretends
that Bolling is defensible on originalist grounds, and it may just
be a decision that makes no constitutional sense at all. One way
of explaining it, however, is by following an originalist, checks-
and-balances approach. Because the Founders understood that
20. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, (1971) (upholding the application
of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act to local loan-shark racket); United
States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (affirming conviction of pharmacist under fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for failing to affix required warning label on pill
boxes).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .... ").
22. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 460 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 877 (1972) (upholding the application ofOrganized Crime Control Act of 1970 to
local gambling); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd
without opinion, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980) (uphold-
ing application of federal RICO statute to local racketeering).
23. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. I drop a footnote in response to one of Professor Graglia's footnotes. See Grag-
lia, supra note 3, at 153, n.lO. Some people in the United States noticed a bit of racial
tension for several hundred years before the courts began ordering anybody to be
hired or admitted on the basis of race.
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the States possessed a general police power and the federal
government did not, one could plausibly say, and correctly so,
that the States were presumed to have much greater freedom
of action than the federal government. Bolling can then be un-
derstood in the following sense: IfBrown was correctly decided,
it limits the power of the States to treat their citizens in a cer-
tain way. To restore the original understanding of a federal
government oflimited and delegated powers, we must then put
at least as much restriction on the federal government as we
have just put on the States. That is one way of explaining it. It
may not sound very good, and perhaps one cannot write ajudi-
cial opinion that way. I amjust trying to tell a story about what
might have occurred.
I do not belabor these examples in order to claim that this
argument is correct. My argument does not rest on whether
one agrees with any of these decisions. I only suggest that the
originalists' problem when confronting the Bill of Rights is
more complex than simply ascertaining a clause's original
"meaning." The original vision of the balance of power be-
tween the federal government and the citizens who delegated
authority to the federal government through the States has al-
ready been corrupted. One might nevertheless insist on limit-
ing the Bill of Rights to the rights designed to protect people
against a small federal government, but that would surely upset
the balance from what the Framers expected the Bill to be.
If the courts are up to what I suggest, that, too, is original-
ism. One may like it or one may dislike it, but it is really the
same animal.
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